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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-3902 
___________ 
 
BARKLEY GARDNER, 
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 WARDEN LEWISBURG USP                                              
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 03-14-cv-00858) 
District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley 
___________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 19, 2016 
 
Before: MCKEE,* HARDIMAN, and RENDELL,  
Circuit Judges. 
 
                                                 
* Chief Judge Theodore A. McKee’s term as Chief 
Judge ended on September 30, 2016. 
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Office of United States Attorney 
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Harrisburg, PA 17108 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 A federal prisoner who wishes to challenge the 
constitutionality of his incarceration may file a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In the 
exceptional circumstance when § 2255 is inadequate or 
ineffective to do so, however, a petition may be filed under 
the general habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In Okereke v. 
United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002), we held that 
§ 2255 was adequate and effective to adjudicate a claim of 
sentencing error under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000). The question this appeal presents is whether § 2255 is 
an adequate and effective means to adjudicate a claim of 
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sentencing error under Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 
2151 (2013). We hold that it is.  
I 
In 1996, Appellant Barkley Gardner and four others 
were convicted on charges related to their involvement in a 
drug conspiracy that operated in New York, Maryland, and 
North Carolina. See United States v. Celestine, 43 F. App’x 
586, 589 (4th Cir. 2002) (affirming Gardner’s convictions). 
Members of the conspiracy murdered a rival drug dealer, 
Lateisha Beaman, by carjacking and kidnapping her, taking 
her into the woods, and shooting her. Id. They also murdered 
another defendant’s former girlfriend, Roneka Jackson, after 
she tried to report their illegal activity. See id. at 589–90. 
A jury in North Carolina convicted Gardner of seven 
federal crimes: (1) racketeering; (2) racketeering conspiracy; 
(3) conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance; (4) 
conspiracy to commit murder; (5) murder in aid of 
racketeering, aiding and abetting; (6) carjacking resulting in 
death; and (7) using and carrying a firearm during and in 
relation to a crime of violence causing death, aiding and 
abetting. Gardner was sentenced to imprisonment for “his 
natural life on each of Counts 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7, and 120 
months [on] Count 4, all to be served concurrently,” and a 
special assessment totaling $350. App. 111A–12A. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed 
Gardner’s convictions. Celestine, 43 F. App’x at 598, cert. 
denied, Gardner v. United States, 537 U.S. 1095 (2002). 
After his direct appeal became final, Gardner filed a motion 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
North Carolina under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to vacate or 
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modify his sentence based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel. The district court denied Gardner’s motion, and the 
Fourth Circuit again affirmed. United States v. Gardner, 231 
F. App’x 284 (4th Cir. 2007). 
In May 2014, Gardner filed a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Middle District 
of Pennsylvania—where he remains incarcerated—claiming 
he is being held in violation of the United States Constitution 
in light of the Supreme Court’s intervening decisions in 
Alleyne, Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014), and 
Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014). In 
Alleyne, the Supreme Court mirrored its opinion in Apprendi, 
and held that “[a]ny fact that, by law, increases the 
[mandatory minimum] penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that 
must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable 
doubt.” Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155 (citation omitted). 
Burrage confirmed this rule by applying it to a specific 
penalty enhancement. 134 S. Ct. at 887. And Rosemond 
changed the standard for aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c). 134 S. Ct. at 1243. 
On July 7, 2014, the Magistrate Judge recommended 
dismissing Gardner’s § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction 
because Gardner’s claims should have been raised in a § 2255 
motion filed in the court that sentenced him: the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. Two 
months later, the District Court adopted the Magistrate 
Judge’s report and recommendation denying Gardner’s 
§ 2241 petition, dismissing his claims under Alleyne on 
jurisdictional grounds. Gardner argued that because facts that 
increased his mandatory minimum penalty were not found by 
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, “Alleyne invalidates his 
concurrent life sentences.” Gardner v. Thomas, 2014 WL 
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4351534, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 2, 2014). The District Court 
held that it lacked jurisdiction to decide this claim because 
“the presumptive means for federal prisoners to challenge 
their convictions or sentences is a section 2255 motion, not a 
section 2241 petition,” and “a section 2241 petition is limited 
to circumstances where the remedy available under section 
2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of 
detention.” Id. at *2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) and Okereke, 
307 F.3d at 120). Noting that Alleyne simply mirrored the rule 
announced in Apprendi, and that Okereke held that § 2255 
motions are adequate and effective means to adjudicate 
claims of Apprendi error, the District Court concluded: “it 
follows that Alleyne claims must also be brought under 
section 2255.” Id. at *3. The Court denied Gardner’s motion 
and he filed this appeal. 
II 
The District Court had the power to ascertain its own 
jurisdiction, Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 
(2006), and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1291 and 2253(a). We exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s order denying Gardner’s petition for lack of 
jurisdiction, and we may affirm the District Court’s order “for 
any reason supported by the record.” Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 
F.3d 533, 535 & n.4 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).  
III 
 We begin by considering whether Gardner’s claims of 
error under Alleyne qualify for the § 2255 exception that 
would permit review of his claims in a § 2241 petition.  
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A 
Gardner claims he was unlawfully sentenced to life in 
prison for offenses under each of Counts 1–3. These 
sentences were improper, Gardner argues, because not all 
facts that increase the mandatory minimum were submitted to 
the jury as elements of the crime, as the Supreme Court later 
required in Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155. But in order for this 
argument to be considered, Gardner had to establish that the 
District Court had jurisdiction to hear his claim under 28 
U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the 
District Court that it lacked jurisdiction.  
The Supreme Court in Apprendi held that “any fact 
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490. We held in 
Okereke that despite this new requirement, prisoners 
sentenced prior to and in violation of the Apprendi rule may 
not bring habeas petitions under § 2241. Okereke, 307 F.3d at 
120–21. Because “Apprendi dealt with sentencing and did not 
render . . . the crime for which [the defendant] was 
convicted[] not criminal,” we determined that § 2255 motions 
are adequate and effective means to adjudicate claims of 
Apprendi error in prior sentences. Id.   
Alleyne extended the logic of Apprendi to facts 
affecting mandatory minimums for criminal sentences. 
Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155. Both cases regulate sentencing 
procedure and neither makes previously criminal conduct 
noncriminal. For the same reason that Okereke held Apprendi 
claims could not be raised in § 2241 motions—Apprendi did 
not render previously criminal conduct noncriminal, Okereke, 
 7 
 
307 F.3d at 120—we likewise hold that Alleyne claims cannot 
be raised under § 2241. 
This conclusion is consistent with § 2241’s limited 
scope. A court may not entertain a habeas petition under 
§ 2241 made by a federal prisoner “in custody under sentence 
of a [federal] court . . . unless it also appears that the remedy 
by motion [under § 2255] is inadequate or ineffective to test 
the legality of [the prisoner’s] detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
Section 2255, in turn, imposes several restrictions: motions 
must be raised in the trial court that sentenced the prisoner 
and within one year of sentencing, and the opportunity for 
successive filing is limited. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(e), 
(f), (h). Despite these stringent requirements, we have held 
that § 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective “merely because 
[a] petitioner is unable to meet [them].” In re Dorsainvil, 119 
F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997). Rather, the petitioner must 
show something more to establish inadequacy or 
ineffectiveness. 
There are situations where the remedy under § 2255 is 
actually “inadequate or ineffective,” but they are rare. For 
example, in Dorsainvil we held that § 2255 relief was 
unavailable when a prisoner “had no earlier opportunity to 
challenge his conviction for a crime that an intervening 
change in substantive law may negate” and which “the 
government concedes . . . should be applied retroactively.” 
Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251. Such a situation that warrants 
§ 2241 jurisdiction will indeed be “unusual.” Id.; see also id. 
at 252–53 (Stapleton, J., concurring) (summarizing the Court 
as holding § 2255 inadequate “in a case where the 
gatekeeping provisions bar a successive petitioner who can 
allege actual innocence of the crime of which he was 
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convicted and who, at the time of his earlier petition(s), could 
not demonstrate that innocence” (emphasis added)). 
We emphasized in Okereke that Dorsainvil’s 
interpretation of § 2255 provides only a “narrow exception” 
to its “presumptive” exclusivity. Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120. 
We also noted that unlike the change in substantive law 
leading to the exception in Dorsainvil, issues that might arise 
regarding sentencing did not make § 2255 inadequate or 
ineffective. Id. at 120–21. The prisoner’s inability to satisfy 
§ 2255’s gatekeeping requirements in Okereke did not alter 
our analysis that the district court lacked jurisdiction to 
consider a § 2241 petition. Id. 
Like Apprendi, Alleyne did not establish a rule that 
made prior criminal conduct noncriminal. We have 
previously noted that Alleyne is essentially an extension of 
Apprendi. See United States v. Burnett, 773 F.3d 122, 136 (3d 
Cir. 2014). Therefore, under the logic of Okereke, 307 F.3d at 
120, Gardner’s Alleyne challenge cannot be raised in a § 2241 
petition based on Dorsainvil-like claims of actual innocence.  
Gardner responds by arguing that if Congress had 
intended to limit § 2255’s savings clause only to “actual 
innocence” claims, the legislature would have drafted the 
statute differently. This argument misperceives the animating 
principle of our decision in Dorsainvil. There, we recognized 
that § 2255’s savings clause provides a safety valve for actual 
innocence, but without short-circuiting § 2255’s gatekeeping 
requirements. See Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251. Adopting 
Gardner’s approach—under which all sentencing issues based 
on new Supreme Court decisions could be raised via § 2241 
petitions—would accomplish just that. The exception would 
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swallow the rule that habeas claims presumptively must be 
brought in § 2255 motions.  
And § 2255 already addresses the effect of an 
intervening change to the scope of criminality by allowing 
some successive motions. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(f)(3), (h)(2). 
Gardner’s approach vitiates these statutory provisions without 
explaining why the statutory scheme, as written, would not 
have allowed him to adequately raise his Alleyne claim in a 
§ 2255 motion. In sum, because “§ 2255 [i]s not inadequate 
or ineffective for [a prisoner] to raise his Apprendi 
argument,” Okereke, 307 F.3d at 121, it is not inadequate or 
ineffective to raise an Alleyne argument either.  
B 
Because upholding Gardner’s convictions on the 
counts he has challenged under Alleyne will result in 
affirming three of his concurrent life sentences, we need not 
address the merits of his challenge under Rosemond in light 
of the concurrent sentence doctrine. See United States v. 
McKie, 112 F.3d 626, 628 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997).  
Our rejection of Gardner’s Alleyne claim means that 
Counts 1–3 will be unaffected by his § 2241 petition. His 
additional claim under Rosemond—based on a broad reading 
of that decision’s holding on which we won’t pass 
judgment—would at most affect Counts 5–7. Accordingly, 
our review of the Rosemond claim cannot alter the term of 
Gardner’s imprisonment. Thus, under the concurrent sentence 
doctrine, we would decline to do so even if his Rosemond 
claim were persuasive. See United States v. Ross, 801 F.3d 
374, 381 (3d Cir. 2015); Jones v. Zimmerman, 805 F.2d 1125, 
1128 (3d Cir. 1986). 
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Gardner argues that his special assessment ($50 per 
felony, or $350 total) means that his sentences are not truly 
concurrent in light of Ray v. United States, 481 U.S. 736, 737 
(1987) (per curiam). That argument has been foreclosed by 
our decision in Ross. In that case, we held that because 
collateral attacks can challenge only a prisoner’s custody, 
special assessments are not reviewable in habeas corpus 
proceedings. See Ross, 801 F.3d at 381–82. Ross leaves some 
room to argue that other “adverse collateral consequences” of 
multiple convictions may rise to the level of “custody,” id. at 
382–83, but Gardner identifies no such consequences in his 
case, even as he emphasizes this exception to the concurrent 
sentencing doctrine. Although the range of adverse collateral 
consequences is quite broad, id., Gardner cannot show that 
any rise to the level of “custody” in this case given his other 
life sentences. Accordingly, we invoke the concurrent 
sentence doctrine and decline to address whether Rosemond 
undermines Gardner’s aiding and abetting convictions. 
IV 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order denying Gardner’s § 2241 habeas petition for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
